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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
STATE OP UTAH/

]l

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I

Case No. 870113-CA

Plaintiff-Respondent/
vs.
KENNETH EUGENE WYNIA,

]1

Defendant-Appellant.

Category No. 2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was defendant denied a fair trial due to ineffective
assistance of counsel?

2.

Was defendant entrapped into committing the offenses
charged?

3.

Did the Trial Court err in admitting exhibits into
evidence where the chain of custody had not been
fully established?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged with four counts of violation of
§ 58-37-8 (Addendum 1/ 2),

distribution of a controlled substance

for value/ two counts in second degree for cocaine and two counts
in the third degree for marijuana (R. 2-3). Prior to trial
defendant made a motion to claim entrapment as a defense pursuant
to § 76-2-303/ U.C.A. (R. 10; Addendum 2).

On the day called for

trial/ the Court heard testimony on the issue of entrapment (Tr.
38).

Defense counsel called the state's chief witnesses in

support of his contention that defendant had been entrapped (Tr.
-1-

38/ 53). Defense counsel called no other witnesses and submitted
his motion without argument (Tr. 58). After the Court denied the
motion/ defense counsel told the Court that the main reason he
brought the entrapment motion was so that he could raise the
issue before the jury (Tr. 58).
Two police officers who were working as undercover
agents for the Metro Narcotics Strike Force in Tooele County were
the state's chief witnesses (Tr. 75/ 78/ 130-31).

Detective

Celeste Paquette testified that she arid Officer Patricia Pusey
went to Tooele on January 3# 1986 and stopped at a bowling alley
called Harris Lanes (Tr. 79-80).

While she was playing pool she

met a person called Tony (Tr. 80). They began talking about
"partying" and types of drugs available (Tr. 80-1).

Detective

Paquette told him she'd like some marijuana "tonight" and Tony
told her he could get some (Tr. 81; note: pages 81 and 82 are
filed out of sequence between Tr. 94 and 95). Tony went across
the room and brought back a man whom he introduced as Ken (Tr.
81).

The three of them discussed the purchase of a quarter ounce

of marijuana (Tr. 82). Tony told her the cost would be $30 and
took $30 from her (Tr. 82). Both Tony and Ken left the bar and
returned about an hour later (Tr. 82). Ken then asked Detective
Paquette for a ride to the Sandbagger Lounge and she agreed to
give him one (Tr. 82-3).

Officer Pusey and Detective Paquette

drove to the lounge with Ken and Toi.y (Tr. 83). She testified
that while seated in her car in the lounge's parking lot Ken
passed her a baggie of marijuana (Tr. 83).
At trial Detective Paquette identified the defendant as
-2-

the person she met known as "Ken" (Tr. 79-80).
Officer Pusey testified that she went to the bowling
alley in Tooele with Detective Paquette on January 3# 1986 (Tr.
131).

She met the defendant while playing pool (Tr. 131-32).

After a short conversation about "partying"/ she asked him if he
could get her some cocaine (Tr. 132). Detective Pusey testified
that she first mentioned drugs and asked defendant if he could
get some for her (Tr. 135). She said defendant told her he would
get what he could and then left the bar with a person called Tony
(Tr. 132). When he returned he asked for a ride to the
Sandbagger Lounge (Id.).

As they walked to the police officers1

car the defendant handed her a small bindle and she gave him $40
(Tr. 132/ 142-43).

Detective Paquette/ on the other hand

testified that she saw Ken pass Officer Pusey a small bindle
while they were in the car driving to the Sandbagger (Tr. 88).
On January 10/ 1986 the two officers went to the
Sandbagger Lounge in Tooele (Tr. 90). Detective Paquette
testified that after they started playing pool the defendant
approached them and began talking (Tr. 90). She said that he
asked Officer Pusey if she wanted more cocaine (Tr. 90)/ while
Officer Pusey testified she initiated the conversation about
purchasing drugs (Tr. 146)/ Detective Paquette admitted she asked
defendant first about getting her some more marijuana (Tr. 91).
He tol£ her that she should wait and he would take her to get
some (Tr. 92). They later drove in Paquette's car to a trailer
park in Tooele (Tr. 94). The defendant introduced her to a woman
named Sherry in one of the trailers (Tr. 94). She said she had
-3-

marijuana to sell and gave Detective Paquette a baggie for $45
(Tr. 94). Defendant witnessed the transaction (Tr. 94).
Officer Pusey testified that on January 10/ 1986 she
asked defendant if he could get her some cocaine (Tr. 137). He
agreed and made some phone calls (Tr. 137). He then came back to
her and introduced her to a person named Matt (Tr. 137). Matt
sold her a bindle of cocaine for $35 he had gotten from someone
else (never identified) at the bar (Tr. 138). Paquette and Pusey
testified that they drank alcoholic beverages on both occasions
(Tr. 99/ 104/ 146-47).

Pusey testified that it was possible that

she or Detective Paquette had purchased beer for the defendant on
both January 3 and 10 (Tr. 149-50).
Paquette and Pusey testified that the suspected
narcotics were transported to the Salt Lake city evidence room/
sealed and dropped into the night deposit room (Tr. 84-5/ 95/
133/ 139). Earl Price with Metro Narcotics testified that he
retrieved the exhibits from the evidence room/ transported them
to the State toxicology lab/ gave them to David Murdock at the
lab and picked them up from Terrance Weaver (Tr. 117/ 121-27).
Both Murdock and Weaver are criminalists for the state toxicology
lab (Tr. 129). Mr. Weaver and Kevin Smith testified as to the
tests they ran on the evidence (Tr. 156-58/ 169-72).
did not testify.

Mr. Murdock

Defense counsel objected to the introduction of

the drug exhibits on the basis that the chcin of custody had not
been established (Tr. 164-65/ 176). The Court overruled his
objection and the exhibits were admitted (Tr. 165/ 176).
At the close of the state's case/ defense counsel
-4-

rested without calling any witnesses (Tr. 177). Defense counsel
never questioned the officers about the discrepancies in their
testimony (Tr. 97-113/ 142-47).

The defense of entrapment was

argued to the jury and presented in jury instructions (Tr.
189-91, R. 33).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

Defendant was denied a fair trial through the

ineffective assistance of counsel.

Although entrapment had been

raised as a defense, counsel never questioned the discrepancies
in the testimony of the state's chief witnesses nor did he
highlight for the jury the acts of the undercover officers which
constituted entrapment.

In the entrapment hearing before the

Court prior to trial he did not argue the applicable law and
facts before submitting the entrapment issue to the Court.
Further, he failed to point out the weakness in the chain of
custody to the jury once the Court had admitted the challenged
exhibits into evidence.
2.

Defendant was entrapped into committing the

offenses charged due to the tactics of the undercover officers.
The officers did not know defendant prior to their first contact
with him on January 3, 1987.

They admitted initiating the

conversations with him concerning the purchase of narcotics.

One

of them also conceded that they possibly bought him drinks.
3.

The chain of custody for the state's exhibits of

alleged narcotics involved in the transactions with defendant was
-5-

not completely established..

The state crime lab criminalist

(David Murdock) who accepted custody of all four exhibits from
the police officer who obtained them from the police evidence
locker did not testify.

The two criminalists who did test the

exhibits offered into evidence did not testify that they received
the alleged contraband from Mr. Murdock.

The evidence should

thus have been excluded.

ARGUMENT

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DENIED
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL

As a result of the ineffective assistance of his
counsel at trial/ defendant was denied the right to counsel
guaranteed by Article 1/ § 12 of the Utah Constitution and by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
(Addendum 3).

The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that in

order to challenge a conviction on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel/
it is the defendant's burden to show: (1) that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner/ and (2) that the outcome of the
trial would probably have been different but for
counsel's error.
state v. Geary/ 707 P.2d 645/ ^46 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted).
An accused in a criminal case has "the right to have
competent counsel who will take such actions and present whatever
-6-

defenses and interpose whatever objections he can in honesty and
good conscience justify in the interest of his client."

State v.

Gray/ 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979) (fn. omitted).
In a case where entrapment is raised as a defense/ the
discrepancy in testimony between state's witnesses is
particularly important.

However/ defense counsel never

questioned Paquette and Pusey regarding the discrepancy as to
when the defendant allegedly gave cocaine to Pusey on January 3.
Pusey testified that he gave it to her in the bowling alley
parking lot on the way to the car (Tr. 132/ 142-43).

Paquette

testified that he gave it to Pusey while in the car driving to
the Sandbagger (Tr. 88). Further/ he did not note the
discrepancy between the officers1 testimony as to who first
initiated the discussion regarding cocaine on January 10. Pusey
said she did (Tr. 146)/ while Paquette said the defendant did
(Tr. 90).
In addition/ he failed to highlight/ in closing
argument/ the acts of the officers which constituted the acts of
entrapment (Tr. 189-91)/ nor did he even discuss the applicable
law and facts before the Court ruled against him (Tr. 58).
Counsel also erred in not pointing out the weakness in
the chain of custody for the narcotics to the jury after the
Court admitted it into evidence.

One of the custodians of the

narcotics/Dave Murdock did not testify at trial. Nevertheless/
the Court admitted the narcotics into evidence over defense
counselfs objection.

The Utah Supreme Court has held:

[a] weak link in the chain [of custody] and any doubt
-7-

created by it go to the weight of the evidence once the
trial court has exercised the discretion to conclude
that in reasonable probability the preferred evidence
has not been changed in any important respect.
State Ve Bradshaw/ 680 P.2d 1036/ 1039 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted).

It was thus defense counsel's duty to point out the

weakness in the evidence to the jury.
The first part of the Geary test has been satisfied
since defendant has demonstrated above that trial counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner.

As

to whether the outcome of the trial would probably have been
different since the police officers were the main witnesses
against defendant/ their credibility was a crucial element of the
state's case.

Defense counsel's failure to closely question them

and point out their discrepancies in testimony/ left the jury
with no challenge to their credibility.

The chain of custody for

the physical evidence against defendant was flawed/ yet defense
counsel never pointed this out to the jury.

Since the issue of

entrapment was crucial to the defense's case/ counsel's failure
to highlight to the jury the acts of the officers which
constituted entrapment was prejudicial/ and/ complied with the
other deficiencies noted above/ clearly affected the outcome of
the trial.

DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED INTO COMMITTING
THE OFFENSES CHARGED

The drug transactions of which defendant was accused
-8-

and convicted all occurred as the result of contacts made by
female undercover agents in a social setting.

The agents

admitted that in these situations they tried to blend in with the
other people at the bar (Tr. 113). Not only did they consume
alcoholic beverages on these occasions/ but they also purchased
such beverages for defendant and others.

Each time they were the

ones who initiated the conversations about partying and asked if
defendant could get drugs for them.

Also# they had never met

defendant prior to January 3/ 1987/ so they had no reason to
suspect he was involved in the distribution of narcotics when
they first began talking to him.
Regarding the defense of entrapment/ § 76-2-303(1)
states:
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped
into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a
law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by
one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit the offense
does not constitute entrapment.
§ 76-2-303/ U.C.A. (1953/ as amended 1973) (Addendum 2).
The Utah Supreme

Court has held that "only police

conduct that 'entraps1 those ready and willing to commit the
crime is acceptable."

State v. Cripps/ 692 P.2d 747/ 750 (Utah/

1984).
In assessing police conduct under the objective
standard/ the test to determine an unlawful entrapment
is whether a law enforcement official or an agent/ in
order to obtain evidence of the commission of an
offense/ induced the defendant to commit such an
offense by persuasion or inducement which would be
-9-

effective to persuade an average person/ other than one
who was merely given the opportunity to commit the
offense.
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based
primarily on sympathy/ pity/ or close personal
friendship/ or offers of inordinate sums of money/ are
examples/ depending on an evaluation of the
circumstances in each case/ of what might constitute
prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the course of
conduct between the government representative and the
defendant/ the transactions leading up to the offense/
the interaction between the agent and the defendant/
and the response to the inducements of the agent/ are
all to be considered in judging what effect the
governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal
person.
State v. Taylor/ 599 P.2d 496/ 503 (Utah, 1979) (fn. omitted).
Here/ as in State v. Kourbelas/ 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah
1980) and State v. Sprague/ 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984)/ the
undercover officers had no reason to suspect that defendant was
involved in the drug trade.

Instead/ they went to a bar/ drank

beer and played pool in order to fit in (Tr. 113). They also in
all likelihood purchased beer for the defendant once they had met
him.

The officers initiated conversations about "partying" and

the use of drugs and admitted that on each occasion they asked
the defendant if he could get drugs for them.

Also/ the officers

were female and in all likelihood their sex assisted in making
the acquaintance of defendant and others at the bar (Tr. 51).
Detective Paquette said she and Officer Pusey had a cover story
prepared to cut off any sexual advances (Id.).
In State v. Kaufman/ 734 P.2d 465 [Utah 1987), the
Supreme Court held that defendant had been entrapped where the
female undercover officer used her attractiveness and relative
youthfulness to become defendant's friend and to induce the
-10-

defendant to purchase supposedly stolen merchandise.

Id,, at 468.

Here the officers used similar tactics to "fit in" at the bowling
alley/ and induce him to obtain drugs for them.

Such police

tactics cannot be condoned as a matter of public policy.
The police entrapment of January 3 continued to January
10.

In State v. Taylor/ supra/ the Supreme Court held that

defendant had been entrapped into distributing drugs for value on
two occasions —
497-98).

September 27 and October 4, 1977 (599 P.2d

The transactions were thus separated by a week/ yet the

Court ascribed the same motives to defendant on each date and
dismissed both convictions.

Here/ the social context and

contacts were virtually identical/ with the officers again
initiating the conversations regarding the purchase of drugs.
Under the facts and case law discussed above/ the trial
court erred in not ruling that defendant had been entrapped as a
matter of law.

THE STATE'S NARCOTICS EXHIBITS SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WHERE THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY WAS NOT FULLY ESTABLISHED

David Murdock/ a criminalist with the state toxicology
laboratory/ received the suspected narcotics from Officer Price
for testing (Tr. 126-27).

Tests **ere performed by other

criminalists/ who testified at the trial.

Mr. Murdock did not

testify as to his custody of the contraband; no testimony was
received as to whether Mr. Murdock's initials or other indication
-11-

of custodianship appeared on the suspected contraband tested by
Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith.

Neither Weaver nor Smith testified

that they received the contraband (State's Exhibits 1 through 4)
from Mr. Murdock.
It is a general rule that before physical evidence may
be received in evidence/ the party offering it must lay
a foundation. It must be identified as the object in
question and there must be shown a chain of custody.
This is particularly true of narcotics which are
susceptible to alteration or substitution.
State v. Petralia, 110 Ariz. 530/ 521 P.2d 617/ 623 (1974)
(emphasis added)/ cited with approval in State v. Watson/ 684
P.2d 39/ 40 (Utah 1980).
In State v. Madsen/ 28 Utah 2d 108/ 498 P.2d 670
(1972)/ the Supreme Court examined a chain of custody argument.
In upholding admission of narcotics into evidence/ the Court
noted that "each of the persons who had custody of the exhibit
one time or another testified to their possession and their
disposition of it until it was finally offered in evidence."

498

P.2d at 672.
Before a physical object or substance connected with
the commission of a crime is admissible in evidence
there must be a showing that the proposed exhibit is in
substantially the same condition as at the time of a
crime. The circumstances surrounding the preservation
and custody of the article and the likelihood of
tampering are factors to be considered in determining
its admissibility.
498 P.2d at 672.
Here the evidence sought to be introduced/ narcotics/
is easily subject to alteration or substitution.

The State

failed to establish the chain of custody since it did not present
any evidence that the exhibits sought to be introduced were in
-12-

fact the same narcotics that had been given to Mr. Murdock by
Officer Price.

The trial court thus abused its discretion when

it admitted State's Exhibits 1 through 4 into evidence over
defense counsel objections.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully asks the Court to reverse his
convictions in this case for the reason^discussed above.
Dated t h i s ^9> ^/d&y tft S8fc#6mber^

Margo Lv' James

f\

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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Addendum 1

KEITH F. OEHLER
Deputy Tooele County Attorney
Tooele County Courthouse
47 South Main Street
T o o e l e , Utah 8 4 0 7 4
T e l e p h o n e : 8 8 2 - 5 5 5 0 , E x t . 351
IN THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR T O O E L E C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH

mt

i i H 11 ur u i a n ,
Plaintiff,

vs.

INFORMATION

Js

Circuit Court No. /*SdotLo

KENNETH E ^ WYNIA
DOB: 08-18-55

OOS

D i s t r i c t Court N o .

T A o e U . t W Y , . Def e n d a n t .

The u n d e r s i g n e d

/vVjsiy/*

,^r//7,j/)i>?NA/

under oath

on i n f o r m a t i o n and b e l i e f that the d e f e n d a n t committed

states

the crime o f :

COUNT I:
D I S T R I B U T I O N OF A C O N T R O L L E D S U B S T A N C E FOR V A L U E , a Third
Degree F e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Title 5 8 , C h a p t e r 3 7 , Section 8,
U . C . A . , 1 9 5 3 , as a m e n d e d , as f o l l o w s : That on or about the 3rd day of
J a n u a r y , 1 9 8 6 , in T o o e l e C o u n t y , State of U t a h , the said KENNETH E.
WYNIA
k n o w i n g l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d
for v a l u e , a g r e e d ,
c o n s e n t e d , o f f e r e d , or arranged to d i s t r i b u t e for v a l u e , or p o s s e s s e d
with intent to d i s t r i b u t e for v a l u e , a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , t o - w i t :
marijuana.
C O U N T I I : D I S T R I B U T I O N OF A C O N T R O L L E D S U B S T A N C E FOR V A L U E , a Second
Degree F e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Title 5 8 , C h a p t e r 3 7 , Section 8,
U . C . A . , 1 9 5 3 , as a m e n d e d , as f o l l o w s : That on or about the 3rd day of
J a n u a r y , 1 9 8 6 , in T o o e l e C o u n t y , State of U t a h , the said KENNETH E.
WYNIA
k n o w i n g l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d
for v a l u e , a g r e e d ,
c o n s e n t e d , o f f e r e d , or arranged to d i s t r i b u t e for v a l u e , or possessed
with
intent
to d i s t r i b u t e
for v a l u e , a S c h e d u l e
II c o n t r o l l e d
substance, to-wit: cocaine.
C O U N T I I I : D I S T R I B U T I O N OF A C O N T R O L L E D S U B S T A N C E FOR V A L U E , a Third
Degree F e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Title 5 8 , C h a p t e r 3 7 , Section 8,
U . C . A . , 1 9 5 3 , as a m e n d e d , as f o l l o w s :
That on or about the 10th day
of J a n u a r y , 1 9 8 6 , in Tooele C o u n t y , State of U t a h , the said KENNETH E.
WYNIA
k n o w i n g l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d
for v a l u e , a g r e e d ,

C00002

inc

o i n i t.
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umn
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IM.IHII.III

i. •

n I n JL n

Information

c o n s e n t e d , offered, or arranged to distribute for v a l u e , or possessed
with intent to distribute for v a l u e , a controlled s u b s t a n c e , to-wit:
marijuana.
COUNT IV: D I S T R I B U T I O N OF A C O N T R O L L E D SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE, a Second
Degree Felony, in violation of Title 5 8 , Chapter 3 7 , Section 8,
U.C.A., 1 9 5 3 , as amended, as f o l l o w s :
That on or about the 10th day
of J a n u a r y , 1 9 8 6 , in Tooele County, State of Utah, the said KENNETH E.
WYNIA knowingly and i n t e n t i o n a l l y distributed for v a l u e , agreed,
c o n s e n t e d , o f f e r e d , or arranged to distribute for value, or possessed
with
intent
to distribute
for v a l u e , a Schedule
II controlled
s u b s t a n c e , to-wit: c o c a i n e .
PROBABLE CAUSE
confidential
powdery

the

white

On each

of the aforesaid

dates,

informants purchased or witnessed the purchase of a white

substance

referenced

STATEMENT:

and

Defendant.
substance

a

brown

Subsequent
purchased
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from

analyses by the State

determined

fact, c o c a i n e ; and of the brown

substance,

that
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the

above-
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the substance

purchased, that

w a s , in

it w a s , in

fact, m a r i j u a n a .
This

information

following w i t n e s s e s :

is based

on evidence

Frank Scharmann and Lance

obtained

from

the

Sutherland.

COMPLAINANT
SUBSCRIBED
JcAKr

and

, 1986.

sworn

to

before

me

this

/7

day of

Addendum 2
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d ,

1953 a s amended

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is .unlawful for any person
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to produce, manufacture, .or dispense, or to possess with intent
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) to distribute for value or possess with intent to distribute for
value a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) to possess a controlled substance in the course of his business
as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or
prescription;
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance for value or to negotiate to have a controlled
substance distributed or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense,
or negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any other liquid, substance, or material instead of the specific controlled substance so
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated.
G>) Any person who violates Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedules [Schedule] I or II is, upon
conviction, guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedules* HI and [or] IV, or marihuana is, upon conviction, guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable under this Subsection
(l)(b)(ii) is guilty of a second degree felony;
76-2-303. Entrapment.—(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in co-operation with the
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense
does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or
threatening, bodily injury is an element of the offense charged a ad the
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a
person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the
actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether
the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion
shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause
shown may permit & later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant
to the jury at trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted
except that in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at
a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.

Addendum 3
Utah Constitution, Article I

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
* be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense*

United States

Constitution

AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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